Wartime economy Germany (1939-1945)
That a war form brought out, as it would have been absolutely inconceivable for earlier generations. For the first time in well-known history million-armies hit one on the other, and for the first time industrielle achievements and technologies were used, in order to kill. Some, as of invented , , Poisonous gases) came of directly the development entwicklungsschmieden to the arms economy. How very this new extent of the war guidance surprised the contemporaries and their descendants, shows up still today to in common name "the large war" for that The First World War.
These new industrielle to form brought however also certain necessities with itself. As the name already says, now an industry of emergencies was, those in unknown extent from raw materials (, , , etc..) and worker of armaments manufactured. There both nowhere, and completely particularly not in in its secret memorandum it stated that the war with that inevitably, and he is short on it to , had finally again begun the war armament set the four-year plan in strength in Germany. A goal was it, that in four years so far that it would have been up to to the coming arguments.
During the conversion of this plan one proceeded in the way typical for the National Socialist regime. The new task was transferred not an authority already existing, but a completely new was formed. To the point of the "four-year plan authority" became set, and he was equipped with authority handing far. As a direct rival it had in this position naturally and to win should, on 10 million tons of this ore out each year dependent.
Arms production had absolute priority within the four-yearly plan. It accepted such extents that it to a drastic shortage of the available workers came and starting from the summer of 1938 German citizens in the industry were conscripted. In the year 1938 it shows up already here clearly with what and after it during the war substantial problems gotten should. Workers lacking loaded the wartime economy after the enormous losses at the east front just as heavily as missing raw materials. There it by different provision of work programs is already enough before the war already full employment gave and women in accordance with the National Socialist world view at home to remain had to do, came the industry very fast into distress. This problem designating for the German economy, that by the way neither those still those in this measure had, to beginning of war with the concept of the blitzkrieg economy one met.
The time of the blitzkriegs 1939-1941
As Germany to 1. September , had those attacked the opinion its that them the German wartime economy was around well four years ahead. It was well-known that since to rig left. Also its foreign policy, which was extremely aggressive, seemed to confirm that Germany felt strong and for the moment not to be struck was. One may have felt confirmed with outbreak of war, as it that Armed forces in amazingly short time succeeded to thrash Poland. Probably herein also the restraint of France and England lies justified, which left it first during a formal declaration of war and for their part hardly military operations against the third realm started. Germany all other countries was actual in absolute numbers expressed at this time superior, once refrains from the British sea-armed force. So Germany had 1 in the year 1938.710.000.000 on the armament spent, Great Britain however only 358.000.000. (Milward, S. 14) German arms production was thus approximately starting from 1936 into the later months of the yearly 1939 higher and more modern than those of remaining powers. One can state however surprisingly that the relative portion of the armament of the national economy had hardly risen compared with the previous years. Naturally that meant a remaining on a very high level, however one did not turn into definitely to a total wartime economy. General George Thomas; Leader of the Military economic and office for arms, weighted very timely and very clearly about these his opinion after tremendous bad state.
As a proponent of a "depth armament", thus a substantial adjustment of the entire economy on the interests of the armament, he rejected the concept of the blitzkrieg economy categorically. This concept functioned as follows. The portion of the armament of the entire economy remained on relatively low level. Instead one concentrated to manufacture armaments for the respective planned were used. In order to have enough resources available, had one logical-proves production within at present less needed ranges to then throttle. When one prepared thus for the war against Poland, importantly fewer raw materials were assigned to the fleet armament than for instance army materiel. It behaved exactly in reverse during the preparations on the argument with England. Here the emphasis was put on the fleet and the Air Force.
One pursued an extremely flexible arms strategy over two years long, approximately up to the failed attempt to take Moscow and tried to adjust itself optimally in each case to the current opponent. The advantage of this "partial" armament was above all that the remaining economy, which was busy with the production of consumer goods could continue working nearly unimpaired. Of course there were war-conditioned fallings off in production, these fell however based on the national economy and which concerned its effects on the daily life of the citizens substantially smaller out than approximately in Great Britain. One can not let tilt to accept that it was important the National Socialist guidance to expose the population to no all too large strains in order at this time the euphoric war tendency.
The organization of the blitzkrieg economy
To beginning of war there was in Germany a multiplicity of from different ranges, which wanted to put in a word with the topic armament and arms economy and this due to the unfortunate structure of the realm also could. The policy of Hitler to educate for special tasks special staffs which then a highranking personality managed, led to the fact that there was no central instance, which could have intervened regulating. In addition it came that the individual parts that Armed forces, , and as a boss that Four-year plan authority, general George Thomas as directors/conductors of the WiRueAmtes and as Ministers for armament and ammunition. In addition the general staffs of the troop units and naturally Goerings completely special influence came with its favourite child, the Air Force. To this parallelism Thomas meant:
- I express today completely openly, which I already represented for years: our militaryeconomical external organization with the numerous places, which make today in military economy, was in peacetime a measurement birth, for the war is impossible already it.(FD 5454/45, speech by general Thomas of 29. November 1939 (source quotes in the quoting way of the hand catalog of the air Historical Branch by means of FD number. Archives of the air Historical Branch of the air Ministry in London.)
The moreover it is to be noticed that nearly each position, which had to do somehow with armament was dressed by a military. Were natural in rarest falling the expert of economic politics, as above all the Goering frequently remarkable by incompetence proved. Only as in later war years the strategy was limited of the economic possibilities ever more, came slowly however surely ever more civilians into these positions.
Although to here represented principle much konfus, even chaotically must work, it functioned to that nevertheless in connection with one of the most important political tools of the third realm outstanding, Leader instruction. Once arranged and in written form available, this instruction for all places was binding. It made a mobility and a flexibility for the whole system possible, how it can be achieved in a democracy only heavily or not at all. It showed itself as most effective means for the controlling of the entire apparatus, since it was away interspersed promptly over all instances and competitive with one another authorities.
How flexible the whole system was, particularly showed up in the year with the preparations for the attack up . Evenly still one had a land war approximately very successfully led, as to 12. July von General Jodl a paper on behalf of "first considerations over a landing in England" was submitted. After a discussion with the generals Brauchitsch and Halder on the day following on it became still by means of a leader instruction to 13. July the German wartime economy into the appropriate courses guided and those prepares. Within one week plans and instructions had been prepared and the appropriate scheduled figures to the factories had been led.
The difficulties beginning of the economy
For the war production of the years and the most urgent problem was the lack of worker. After a landing in England had not succeeded and " to the documents put was, was concerned one now again with the enemy in the east. That Leader instruction for this became to . One regarded the blitzkrieg strategy also here as the best, since one assumed that the Soviet army in terms of figures on the conditions of 1914 and after the large cleanings, which above all officers to the victim fell, is also qualitatively underlaid. Of course now different priorities had to be set than approximately in the context of arms production . Since the fleet and the Air Force were however still bound at the west front, one concentrated on certain emphasis of the naval and Air Force production. Resources from other ranges were left to the army. As one of the largest difficulties the lack of worker began itself to draw already here. For a so enormous land war naturally also many soldiers had to be drawn in, which the situation intensified of far. One turned into now thus in addition, increases foreign workers, thus usually Forced laborerto begin, and originally examine and draw in if necessary as "indispensable" classified persons again. Additionally also soldiers, who dismiss in the summer on vacation certificate were, were drawn in again. It did not succeed nevertheless to bring the production numbers for all arms ranges on the demanded level. So for instance the aircraft construction had to accept an enormous decrease evenly due to these problems.
| Type | Sept. | October. | November. | December. |
| (combat aircraft) | 232 | 189 | 146 | 146 |
| (reconnaissance aircraft) | 83 | 61 | 46 | 32 |
| He 111 | 90 | 98 | 41 | 69 |
| He 126 | 35 | 23 | 12 | 7 |
| BF 110 | 112 | 100 | 73 | 43 |
| 57 | 62 | 57 | 31 | |
| 195 | 144 | 60 | 115 | |
| 47 | 41 | 37 | 30 |
With the attempt failed, those into the knees to force, also the entire German concept of a blitzkrieg economy came into bad emergencies. Nobody had when planning of the enterprise "Barbarossa"counted on so high losses, how they suddenly arose now. How very much one itself in advance estimated, the following example shows: The blitzkrieg strategy was from Keitel to going by defined the fact that one increases neither capacities nor the raw material employment increases and also no new workers to consult has. Rather the superior strategy would disburse itself in such a way that one would thrash the Soviet Union fast and that a higher war production would be not at all necessary.
A consequence of this entire conception was also that it was still usual in Germany, in only one . The introduction of 2 or 3-Schichtsystemen, as for instance in England, would have meant that substantially more learned skilled workers would have been used. These were not available however simply. Also the use of women or any education programs, in order to make these familiar with the machines, was not an option. The regime became in this regard a victim of its own their first large Gegenoffensive started, apart from the obvious military miss also the strategy of the blitzkrieg economy had failed. In ihrem damaligen Zustand war sie nicht in der Lage, auch nur den täglichen Verlust auszugleichen, geschweige denn weiter aufzurüsten. Alan S. Milward fasst das Ende der Blitzkriege wie folgt zusammen:
- A war, which is aligned to short term economic maximum output, must be led strategically in individual impacts. Hitler had arranged his foreign policy from 1939 to the autumn 1941 accordingly. Each military campaign was planned employment concentrated by the leader as on only one goal. Production had to follow in each case this goal, even at expense of arms production in other areas. This proved as feasible, as long as Germany fought only at a front. Of Russia ability to get over the "five-monthly war" Hitler entangled into a two-front war. The one front was predominantly a front of the army troops, the other one a front of the navy and Air Force. In this way the blitzkrieg not possibly became.(Milward, S.52)
That 1942-1945
The break with the principle of the blitzkriegs had been sealed with the defeat at the east front in November 1941. Although one believed still in the "final victory", one began to consider the fundamental strategy. First Hitler separated only very slowly from so long successful concept, but it had to finally see that above all the Soviet Union was so hardly to be defeated. The official proclamation settled then however only to 13. February 1943, when after the defeat in Stalingrad the speed of the armament had to be still further increased and the effects became ever more substantial on the daily life of the civilian population. The change of the arms economy, which Fritz Todt had introduced and which had been continued by Albert Speer, was at this time however already very far progressed. There is therefore a certain discrepancy between the total war in the armaments industry and the official, of the propaganda Ministry opened. Although perhaps the term would be more useful "depth armament" for better distinction, here, the more concise expression because of, far of the "total war" should have been the speech.
If one looks for a central figure, which affected the fate of the German wartime economy considerably, one lands automatically . But speer becomes only in February Ministers for armament and ammunition. The name Fritz Todt is far less well-known against it. This therefore agitates naturally above all that it should be speer, which later than "arms miracles" designated increase in production succeed should. Also the fact likes that it was above all he, that had the allied one available after the war in numerous interviews, and frequently opportunity to present itself their part to have contributed.
The tasks, with which Todt was entrusted, came of at first the area to the building industry. Of first in May with the development of the he was assigned already in the December of plenipotentiaries for the regulation of the building industry. In this period also developed grouping the called "organization Todt". It had itself, as in under Nazi sizes usually, with it resulted in people surround and an own small realm developed. he was appointed the "general inspector for special tasks of the four-yearly plan", where it was incumbent on him, the encroachments of the Air Force on resources of the . Of course that carried the personal enmity for it , which was still in addition formally its superior. Due to its successes it became to 17. March the first realm Minister for armament and ammunition. In this new and relatively weak Ministry he had naturally a difficult position, there he so quasi to the competition for the realm Ministry of Economic Affairs, the WiRueAmt and that became. Already in the summer 1940 it created the first committee for ammunition and tried thereby a completely new form of the arms organization. Principal purposes were Entbuerokratisierung and more efficient working. This first prototype, after whose model the entire industry was again organized later, functioned as follows. A main committee was educated and a set of special committees. In the main committee all planning was regulated over production and the necessary tunings were met. The special committees were assigned in each case to type of ammunition and carried the necessary preparatory work out.
Each materialanforderung of the armed forces was submitted now, after it had been found by Hitler for good, to the main committee. This distributed then the orders and the necessary raw materials to the respective enterprises, talked these however not into the production procedure inside. The result of this new structure was above all that the military got slowly however surely far parts of control extracted. In addition now the industry could be used and charged to capacity project-related, thus substantially more efficiently. The committee system was already expanded in November 1940 on the tank industry, later then also on the weapon industry, since it proved as very effective innovation.
Todt extended the system thereafter from pure production also to the development. A major task of the development committees was it to order to the verschwendung by large standardisation stop. So far it was common for example that the navy and the army had heavy cannons in each case (once mobilely, once on ships bolted on) that these differed however in your specifications so much from each other that neither spare parts nor ammunition were compatible. By eliminating these bad states, enormous rationalization reserves were opened.
Todts efforts were aligned in the following months to a stronger centralization of entire production. The most important armaments should be produced in some few enterprises central, in order to avoid for instance the usual long routes of transportation. In addition such large-scale enterprises would be substantially easier to be controlled had than the many hundreds over the whole realm distribute small factories. Todt at the end of put these opinions January also the leader forwards. It seems that many authority, which its Ministry held had been already now granted and not only, after speer had taken over the office. Obvious thus at least the initial successes of speers are to be added to a considerable degree to Fritz Todt. It left with its death to 8. February 1942 - he fell with an airplane off - a good basis, on which Albert Speer could construct and reach its arms miracle.
Still today the name Albert Speer is connected in the third realm with two of its functions. Usually first its work is called as "Hitler's building masters", within whose frameworks it coined/shaped considerably typical "Nazi architecture". Many more importantly for Germany in the war was however its work than realm Ministers for armament and ammunition.
It followed Fritz Todt after its accident to 8. February 1942 on this posts. To entrust then 37 the year old with this task by speer, somewhat very impulsive and surprising one after-said to the resolution of Hitler again and again, particularly.
- [...] at 11 o'clock he let me come to itself and opened that I was to become Todts successor. My protests remained ineffective. They were probably justified all., after I understood neither about the civil engineering nor about armament something. It insured me that I,es already create ' become and that it has confidence to me. I was the outsider; in this case both for military, and for the party and the industry.(speer report NO. 19. S. 3 (original on English))
Speer made here probably intentionally misleading statements, since this decision had been no completely so large surprise. In addition it had provided not only before already for a doubling of the manufacturing plants for the aircraft construction the available, it was the nearly ideal candidate. He was opposite Hitler absolutely loyal, he knew exactly, how the system Todt with its committees worked, and - perhaps most importantly - it belonged to no group of interests, neither to military nor to the industriellen, who had often mutually blocked themselves in their competitions.
It went very briskly to the work, and so there are for the 19. February already a first voucher for speers pronouncing on the leader, with whom current asking of world politics were discussed. From these conferences of leader nearly continuous recordings into the last days of the third realm, which belong surely also to the most interesting sources for this time, exist. To these conferences all relevant decisions for the wartime economy and the armament were made. With the fact it seems that Hitler was always interested in most in detail questions of the weapon technology and less in the necessary political decisions. Thus often really important decisions are direct apart from relatively unimportant technical details in the recordings.
A serious problem resulted now, since speers Ministry became ever more powerful, with the WiRueAmt. In fact was unemployed the authority led by general Thomas. On second March Thomas's visited speer and sounded out its intentions. In principle one was on a line, wanted to finally intersperse speer nevertheless now depth armament demanded for a long time of Thomas's. In addition by speer a post in the planning committee who can be educated was offered to it, which should worry about general questions of the armements policy. Despite the relatively positive process of the discussion Thomas's held afterwards in a discussion note that speer had not left a doubt about it, "that those of military not longer with the guidance of the wartime economy be entrusted could."(Milward S. 74) it here already suggested itself a tendency, which was characteristic for the further development. Military by their positions were displaced slowly however surely and had the place for restaurant economics to free, or at least for persons, who did not stand for a certain group of interests close.
In the course of the time speer was ever further endeavored to actually tear over the committees controlled by it more and more power. With the leader instruction of 21. March 1942 the committees on broad basis were introduced. Both production and development been subordinate now also within the range of the Air Force and the navy committees, those again the Ministry speer been subordinate. Even if it exercised no control legally seen within these ranges, it took place in fact from now on.
The function of the committees was from different quality. Since those of military regarded their members as intruders and in the Ministry speer a too large and ponderous apparatus saw, sometimes they tried to go around the entire system. Major general Henrici noticed in addition:
- The development committees were different - some worked well. The HWA did not go around the development committees, by negotiating directly with the companies - it was the normal procedure for the HWA to negotiate with the companies whereby both parts thought also of the development committee. If the development committee was weak, then the HWA indicated the clay/tone.(speer report NO. 83)
This quotation is however only one example for the fact that the system of the committees did not function to 100%-ig. It achieved an amazingly high efficiency despite everything. Another, much more urgent problem existed in the continued lack of qualified scientists, who could have gotten the development going of new technologies. New weapons or also only simple improvements required however a neutral scientific instance, since the different conceptions of military and industriellen met one on the other here. While as fast as possible as good a weapons as possible wanted to have, was been the others naturally to obtain as high a profits as possible. In the third realm only Hitler could smooth such questions and decide the final policy as the highest instance. Up to its Faible for completely new superweapons like the V1 or V2 had however hardly the interests in so that many important decisions remained being on this area.
A last problem, speer never into the grasp got, was control of the workers. Of Germany inferiority in this point worsened in the course of the war ever more. Since particularly at the east front high losses were to be deplored, the summoning waves of the armed forces seized the actually indispensable skilled workers of the armaments industry starting from 1942 increased also. For the employment of the workers Fritz Sauckel was responsible in his position as a plenipotentiary for the work input. Appointed by Hitler in March 1942 it took a rather independent position and was everything but a tool of speers. That estimated the situation correctly and meant in addition: "that will my otherwise successful efforts to have centralized round control off of all factors of production."(speer report NO. 19. S. 19) Despite all problems mentioned the era Albert Speer particularly stands in its first year for an amazing rise of the arms indices. Particularly the allied ones were surprised by this achievement, assumed one nevertheless that the German industry ran at the latest since 1939 on full speed. Hardly someone would have counted on the fact that such increases were still possible.
One often speculated after the war, and speer supported these presumptions in its books after forces that it served the Nazi regime only as Buerokrat and even no Nazi was. After it had surrendered with some thousand documents in the luggage the allied one, it began to knit thereby its personal legend, which culminated in it, to stylize itself - not least because of different measures like the obstruction of the Nerobefehls - as resistance fighters against the national socialism. Fact is however that the Second World War without speers of "successes" would have been substantially shorter and many victims (straight also in the concentration camps) would not have died. In view of its authority, above all which concerns the rail transport, its statement, of Holocaust nothing to have known, more than only skurril on.
The arms miracle
Wagenfuehrs index of arms production registers three important phases of the increase in production in the whole one. The terminator point of the first rise is to be found in July 1942, when the production numbers had risen in relation to February over over 50%. Until Decembers they remained on this level, in order to then rise again by May 1943 around further 50%. From December to July 1944 the last increase took place, this time around approximately 45%.
It is clear, which also the allied ones did not leave such paying unbeeindruckt. It was possible to still increase despite the ever more violently becoming air raids production is however explainable and not at all a miracle. The principal reason is naturally that the German industry was only changed over in February 1942 to a real, a total wartime economy, so far thus with full strength had by far not worked. In addition, a further not insignificant reason is the fact that the attacks of the Americans and Briten were at the beginning everything else as well coordinated. If for instance a factory had been attacked and for the eight weeks lasting repair the enterprise to adjust had, no further attack took place after the reopening. The strategy to attack a manufacturing plant and again come if it were so far repaired straight that one could repair munition, found only later a larger spreading.
The economic collapse
The strategy most efficient with distance was however only used starting from 1944. One tried already since longer to extract from Germany the raw materials which it lacked in the country and which had to be specially near-created. The coal however, from which there were still enormous supplies in the Ruhr district in this time, had become finally a crucial weak point. The western allied ones shifted itself now to destroy and to conquer in the further process the shipping and marshalling yards. Nachdem es nicht mehr möglich war, die täglich notwendigen 22.000 Waggons Kohle abzutransportieren, kam die Industrie rasch in arge Nöte. In Einzelfällen wurden zwar auch LKWs eingesetzt, allein machte es der riesige Bedarf unmöglich, ohne die Schiene auszukommen.Already at the end of November 1944 sank ammunition production around well 30%. Many power stations could produce no more river, and some enterprises had to make completely close. Speer also gets straight:
- Not possibly the German economic life is to be maintained in the long term with the still existing hard coal and the still producing rawsteel capacity. [...] the German armament becomes [...] no more in the long one its, also only in the most distant, the needs of the front [...to cover ] and the need for the new list. The material predominance of the opponent is not to be adjusted thereafter no more by the bravery of our soldiers.(FD 2690/45, Bd. 6. speer at Hitler, 15. March 1945, economic situation March/April 1945 and consequences '. (emphases of speer))
There were not many people in the guidance, which could talk so directly and unverbluemt about the threatening defeat with Hitler except speer. When Hitler was then finally convinced that the war was not to be won no more, it issued to 19. March 1945 a leader instruction, which arranged the total destruction of the entire German economic life, the in such a way specified . Speer opposes openly this instruction and was endeavored to save as much as possible from the industry to.
Explosive, which could have come into the wrong ("loyalen") hands, became away-closed, and werksleiter became security equipped with hand-held weapons. Arrangements of the leader, which ran over its Ministry, it amended in such a way that does not destroy machines, but was only divided. With these and many further actions speers Ministry through-crossed systematically most arrangements, which stood in connection with the "Nero instruction". Albert Speer committed thereby in approximately 60 cases
