the central motive behind Nāgārjunas training activity, which put the foundation-stone for the “school of the middle way” (Mādhyamika) and which left buddhistischen philosophy numerous works, was the re-establishment of the teachings Buddhas, their core thought Nāgārjunaaccording to by the ausufernde Scholastik in some schools of the Hīnayāna the risk ran to be lost sight of. Nāgārjuna made use of a special argumentation tool, the “judgement square” systematic the support of its proceeding (skrt. catuṣkoṭi), assistance whose it logical contradictionsin the postulates of his philosophical surrounding field to point out and dekonstruieren tried. The goal of this methodology, which was characterized by extreme points of view by a radical rejection, lay of making the buddhistische teachings understandable again as a consistent way of the center,all this the process of knowing working against mischief seeds opinions - in particular the “eternity faith” (skrt.śāśvatavāda) and the “destruction teachings” (skrt. ucchedavāda) - in principle excludes, to defend and this view against the school opinions spread at its time. The detailed elaboration of the empty heating term (skrt. śūnyatā) in the direct connection with “developing in dependence “(skrt. pratītyasamutpāda) as well as the advancement of the theory of the “two truths” (skrt. satyadvaya) rank among the contributions made by Nāgārjuna, it particularly inone of the influential buddhistischen philosophers of Indian origin make for the traditions of the Vajrayāna and the Zen after Buddha.
Nāgārjunas life and work - myths and legends
over the person Nāgārjunas is as as good as no securedKnowledge available. The Hagiographien, under, it written within the buddhistischen tradition for a long time after its death, certifications in Chinese and in Tibetan language among other things from Paramārtha (499 - 569) and Xuanzang (603 - 664), are very strong with myths and legendsdecorated, and therefore regarding a working of historically provable facts out most unreliably. To these usually educationally angedachten and from large admiration marked legends belong stories, whose contents from tradition are delivered to tradition with easy modifications. One of it -from the feather/spring of the translator Kumārajīva (344 - 413) - Nāgārjuna represents as Magier, to that its ability to make itself invisible uses, to entice together with its companions the Mätressen of an influential ruler. Nāgārjuna and its two companionscreep unnoticed into the palace and put their common plan into practice. On the way back Nāgārjuna escapes that the effectiveness of the spell diminishes with its two friends. The two notionless companions are discovered by the palace guard andexecuted. This painful event, which confronts Nāgārjuna directly with suffering, causes it finally to only dedicate itself from now on to the teachings Buddhas.
In another narration of unknown origin Nāgārjuna excites the attention of a mythischen people by its training speechesof kite-similar queue natures, the Nāgas. There they invite Nāgārjuna from acknowledgment into their homeland world which is on the reason of the sea and hand to it out the Prajñāpāramitā - writings, which Buddha is to have given them for Verwahrung, with thatAsk to make it accessible only then for the world public if humans had become ripe for their message. This legend alludes to meaning of the name “Nāgārjuna”, which means translated about as much as “white queue”. The Indian mythology connects thoseColor white (arjuna) with purity and the symbol of the queue (nāga) with wisdom. A distinguishing feature Nāgārjunas are therefore the queues which up-rise up in traditional representations behind its head (see fig. above). Still many further legends umrankenthe shape of the Nāgārjuna, among other things reports of an incurable illness in the infancy, which it defeated by the entry in a monastery medal and persistent studying of the frühbuddhistischen writings, of Alchemie and Unsterblichkeitselixieren, which let it reach a Biblical age, as well asof its death by beheading with Kuśagras (Poa of cynosuroides), a high Riedgras with sharp stems, which finds in India to holy ceremonies use. The execution desire, which according to that narration the philosopischen opponents Nāgārjunas express, which it defeated in all debates,and the Nāgārjuna from sympathy for its adversaries agrees, can only with this special grass be carried out, since Nāgārjuna thereby is to have killed an insect in one of its earlier lives unintentionally, as which one this opponent at that timewas embodied.
Verifizerbare data to Nāgārjunas actual lives outside of these legends lie to a large extent in the dark. As approximately secured it is considered that Nāgārjuna in 2. Century n. Chr. as a son of a Brahmanenfamilie in the centralIndian region Vidharba in the today's Federal State Maharashtra toWorld came. Probably he spent his later life up to his death around the Amaravati belonging to lain in south India to the today's Andhra Pradesh. On the mountain in this area Sri Parvata with Nāgārjunakoṇḍa is Nāgārjuna at the lower river coursesthe Krishna created and informed a monastery there. The connection Nāgārjunas with the monastery university Nālandā belongs most likely to the numerous legends, there this building only around 5. Century n. Chr. and thus no more was established into thoserecognized life-span Nāgārjunas falls far away. From different sources, among other things the Nāgārjuna attributed literary works “precious Girlande” (ratnāvalī) and “letter to a friend” (suhṛllekha), in which particularly the ethical aspect the buddhistischen teachings one stresses, comes out,that Nāgārjuna probably a friendship of many years to a ruler of the Śātavāhana - dynasty maintained, to which these letters were addressed. It can be reconstructed however not complete, which between 230 the v. Chr. and 199 n. Chr. governing ruler this moveContact with Nāgārjuna kept upright.
The works Nāgārjunas are without exception in Sanskrit written and not in “hybrid Sanskrit”, the language combination of Sanskrit and elements of local Prakrit, more usual in the Māhayāna literature - dialects, those in the India of the time at that time the Pali thangenerally understandable traffic language had replaced. This could have to be attributed to the fact that Nāgārjuna was most common as native Brahmanen the Sanskrit as writing language. In their style its works point a clear influence of the Prajñāpāramitā - literature up, are however at the same time deep into the training speeches Buddhas verwurzelt, to which in them frequently is referred. Nāgārjunas most important treatise are in 27 the chapters partitioned “Lehrstrophen over the fundamental theories of the middle way (Mūlamadkyamakakārikā)”. Besides still further papers, partly philosophical, partly ethical nature come,as authentic works Nāgārjunas in question. In addition count:
- Śūnyatāsaptati (seventy Strophen over the emptyness)
- Vigrahavyāvartaṇī (rejection of the reproaches)
- Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā (Lehrstrophen over developing in dependence)
- Yuktiṣaṣtikā (sixty Strophen of the proof)
- Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (refutation of the remarks [the Nyāya])
- Vyavahārasiddhi (illuminating in thatWorld of the everyday life)
- Bodhicittavivaraṇa (explanation of the illuminating spirit)
- Catuḥstava (four hymns)
- Ratnāvalī (precious Girlande)
- Sūtrasamuccaya (Sūtra collection)
- Bodhisaṃbharaka (conditions for illuminating)
- Suhṛllekha (letter to a friend)
starting points for Nāgārjunas methodology - the philosophical surrounding field and its theories
Nāgārjuna saw itself in the philosophical surrounding field of its epoch, which represented a bloom time of Indian philosophy, confronted with a multiplicity of different buddhistischer as nichtbuddhistischer schools as well as their points of view. That one around the 1. Century v. Chr.using era, the one systematic periodin Indian philosophy, was coined/shaped from one moves debating culture rang in, in which the battles of words were held after the categories (padārtha) of a fixed regulation. It was also the time of the written adjustment of instructional contents in Sūtraform and furthersupplementing comments. In this philosophical contest the Buddhismus was submitted for the first time in its history in comprehensive way of a strict examination on the part of competitive nichtbuddhistischer systems and had to stand about various speech and answer. In addition belonged apart from epistemologischen questions howfor example, which made realization means possible (pramāṇa) a reliable truth identification, also again and again the arising explanation need according to the expiration of the Wiedergeburt and the nature of the reality. Had themselves regarding the important, because with the lawthe Karma directly in connection standing question, in which way causality carries out itself, into which orthodox, the Veda as authority recognizing systems, two fundamental models develops:
- The theory favored by the philosophical system of the Sāṃkhya satkāryavāda (literally about: “Theory ofIts effect "), which mentioned that the effect is already potentially contained in the cause (identity of a cause and effect)
- defended the theory by the system of the Vaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda (“theory of Nichtsein of the effect [before and after their Manifestation]”), thosethe diametrically opposite point of view to the Sāṃkhya takes. The effect is not potentially contained in the cause according to this Lehrmeinung, but both are completely different and separately from each other (difference of a cause and effect).
All other causality models of the nichtbuddhistischen schools placed onlyModifications of these two positions:
- The view of the Jains was expressed epistemological in “syādvāda” (theory of the validity of a statement depending upon individual point of view) and ontologisch in “anekāntavāda” (theory of the diversity of the styles) and taken the position of a synthesis. In accordance with this attitude each statement is true from the respective perspective of the person, who meets it. And the reality possesses not only a only one printable aspect, but can only by denomination of several aspects be verbalisiert. Januaryistic philosophy setconcerning the question about the effect way of causality on the possibility “both and”, a view, which represented also the later theistische development of the Sāṃkhya.
- The fatalists (Ājīvikas) taught against it strict December RMI sneezing mash, which excluded an moral-ethicalally justified causality.They rejected the law of the Karma in favor of a thesis, after which the world happening was steered completely arbitrarily by the run of the fate (niyati). There was itself therefore for humans no possibility, by own effort from the cycleto release the Wiedergeburten (Saṃsāra), since the release for it did not depend on the quality of the acts (akriyavāda).
- The materialists (Lokāyatikas) rejected all generally accepted principles of philosophical-religious Indian thinking. For it there was neither Wiedergeburtstill Karma, and the life ended for it with physical death. The world developed in for its opinion purely coincidentally, without certain regularity or order from the four elements earth, fire, water and air. Due to this attitude they publicised oneHedonismus, the required to no observance of ethical worth ASS ASS.
Into this polyp-hone concert of the aspects joined in two to that altogether 18 schools of the Hīnayāna also: the schools of the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika, itself intensively with in the Abhidharmasystematized theory of the fundamental reality components, the existence factors (dharmas), argued. The vehement discussion over the status of these konstitutiven elements, which had led apart from other reasons at all only to the fact that the Sautrantikas split itself off as independent school the Sarvastivada,included also a controversy over the causal connection between the existence factors also, and in the course its applied the two schools the models satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda to their representations.
The Sarvāstivādin represented the model of a coexistence of allfuture, present and past existence factors in an eternal latency condition, which they leave in each case due to their karmisch caused activation, in order to constitute in changing combinations world and things. After the respective connection, which the existence factors were received, falls apart again, go outthey not completely, but remain again being activated always so long in their Potentialität received to them (skrt therefore also the name “Sarvāstivāda”, of. “exists sarvam asti” = everything). The Sarvastivadin spoke the elements of the reality a “self-existence” (svabhāva)too and revalued their status thereby to “highest reality” (paramārtha). This view equaled for the Sautrāntikas an offence against the central buddhistische science of “non--even “, there the increase of the existence factors on one thatSuperordinate reality stage the existence factors to things and subjects for their part back into the position of a “unwandelbaren even” brought - comparably with the Ātman of the Upaniṣaden. They defended theory of the present/immediateness (kṣaṇikavāda ) in contrast to it, to that-according to the existence factors onlymomentful flash, in order to offense in the same moment again completely. The factors possess therefore no time-spatial expansion and no linear cause effect connection to each other. Before their developing the existence factors were not existence and into this Nichtexistenz completely become them also again after theirPassing transfers.
All these prevailing causality models Nāgārjuna rejects already at the beginning of the first chapter of its “Lehrstrophen over the root of the middle teachings” equally as contradictory:
- “Anywhere and never one does not find Seiendes (bhāva), developed from itself, outother one, from both, or without a cause. “ (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1,1)
the attitude of the Sarvāstivādins with their version satkāryavāda accompanied according to Nāgārjuna with the extreme opinion “of the eternity faith” (śāśvatavāda), there it the existence factors to somewhat eternal and durably existingraised. The Sautrāntikas purged to the other extreme of the “ destruction teachings” (ucchedavāda) with its elaboration asatkāryavāda in the eyes of the Nāgārjunas however, by explaining the existence factors before their developing and after their passing for completely non-existence. Both opinions were for Nāgārjuna compatible with the “middle way” (madhyamā pratipad), he with reference to Buddha with the complete equivalence of “conditioned developing “and” emptyness “did not define. The existence factors are not eternally, there them for their partas a function of causing factors, they exist are not however also destroyed, since they are completely empty due to their dependence self-existence. This understanding summarizes Nāgārjuna in the following sentence:
- “Developing in dependence is it, which we “call emptyness”.It is this a dependent designation (prajnapti), and (straight thereby) is it (the emptyness) the middle way.“(MMK 24,18).
Advancing at these only in the highest insight (prajñā) completely comprehensible circumstances is the central motive, thatbehind Nāgārjunas of entire philosophy stands. Nāgārjuna analyzed the most important buddhistischen ranges of topics before this background.
Nāgārjunas philosophy - the science of the emptyness (śūnyatāvāda)
Nāgārjunas request was a back meditation on the “middle” of the teachings Buddhas, thatin view of the argument between Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntikas threatened to fall the bare speculation over metaphysical conditions to the victim. He was thus neither founder of a new school, nor he was founder of the Mahayana. Nāgārjuna analyzed the most important buddhistischen main topics underthe criterion of the equivalence of conditioned developing and emptyness, which it underlines at the beginning of its “Lehrstrophen over the fundamental theories of the middle way” with the “eight denials”:
- “Nichtvergehen, Nichtentstehen, Nichtabbrechen, Nichtandauern, Nicht-eine-Sache-sein, Nicht-eine-andere-Sache-sein, to non--to-feature-come non--in disappearing going”.
Its judgement hadthe Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntikas, this “middle one” not sufficient inside light, which led to which they purged into extremes: the Sarvāstivādin into “it is always” - position of the eternal duration and the Sautrāntikas into “it are and no more will be” - positionthe destruction. Both schools had deviated in this regard from the buddhistischen path, whose quintessence describes Buddha in one of its training speeches with the following short sentence:“Only I teach one: Suffering and the abolition of suffering " (Majjhima Nikaya, MN 22).
For Nāgārjuna, how it already appeared as trend in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, in particular the ignorance (avidyā) is one of the main sources of suffering, and it applies to diminish it above all different one, around it in response by realization (to replace prajñā) and knowledge (jñāna). This is possible according to for it also on the logical-argumentative way over the theory, to which he quite awards a practical use. It proceeds in its argumentation dekonstruktiv, over with the practicing step forWalked all tendencies of seizing to dissolve to reveal and thus the “middle” which shows up in in such a way won realization.
In order to justify the emptyness on the basis conclusive arguments, Nāgārjuna submits the Vergänglichkeit of the phenomena of a strict analysis. Only because thosePhenomena are empty, then Nāgārjuna argues, can develop and offense it. And because they are empty only, the overcoming of suffering is at all only possible by the four noble truths as well as walking on the noble Achtfachten of path for release. Would bethe phenomena nonempty, there would be no development in the world, everything would be, constantly, to a certain extent “perfectly statically frozen in the infinity”. The things would have solidified unverursacht and, since they did not need any support for their existence, in eternity. But this leaves itselfdo not agree with the observation of the constant change in the world. Anywhere are not imperishable things. And therefore, Nāgārjuna concludes, is nowhere things, which are not empty.
For example a tree depends on the most diverse causing factors: Roots, trunk,Branches, branches, sheets, nutrients in the soil, wind, rain, sun exposure etc. The tree is not from this viewing angle for itself taken at all “there”, but only by interlinking the various factors, it “in the existence raise” - in addition also e.g. belongs.the perception and the linguistic allocation, which are involved to make the tree a significant one which corresponds to a Signifikat. The entire universe participates in this a tree, since all conditions are caused for their part again by other factors.If a factor would be omitted, all different were omitted likewise, them are inseparably with one another verwoben. If the tree would be and an independent phenomenon isolated throughout, which existed independently of conditions, he could not grow and prosper, there he for its presence nothingother one needed than. It would not be developing and passing subjected, always equivalent, freely, deathless. But this contradicts the fact that he changes incessantly, of the grain also sometime up to the knorrigen plant with close sheet stature,again the purge falls and dies.
The things are thus without even (nairātmya), natureless (asvabhāva) and empty (śūnya), there they due to their dependence on causing factors over no “self-existence” (svabhāva) order.
“Self-existence”(also “self-nature” or “self-its” mentioned) out existing, something support lot as technical term of Indian philosophy somewhat from itself, which does not need conditions for its presence, describes. The Atman treated in the Upaniṣaden becomes there for example with the descriptor “self-existence”provided. It holds the status the relative one of superordinate “last reality” in this function, is contrary to the constantly changing, conditioned world in itself justified, eternally, constantly, purely and unentstanden. These are the attributes, those the “self-existence”usually to be awarded. And this self-existence is it, the Nāgārjuna regarding the phenomena excludes in principle.
The world is not for Nāgārjuna evenly because of this absence of self-existence a world of the Seins, but constant becoming. The things are not,separate happened, equal a melody, which is also not, but takes place in the sequence of the tones. Also the existence factors fall into this category, because as such they do not exist independently, them are direct into the relations network “pratītyasamutpāda“merged. Since however now dependence and emptyness mean the same, and not really do not offense the things develop according to Nāgārjuna.
- “For you it may apply that meeting (sambhava) and falling apart (vibhaha) are seen. One only looks meeting and falling apart [however]Glare (moha). “ (MMK 21,11)
the two mischief seeds aspects “of the eternity faith” and “the destruction teachings” provide the things with a substance, which is regarded in the first case as something indestructible and in latter case as well as the phenomenon into the existence stepsand again is lost if the phenomenon disintegrates. But since all in understanding in the Buddhismus does not exhibit a lasting core, it lasts neither on (eternity), nor hears it on be (destruction), is neither one (Monismus), norMuch (Pluralismus). Nāgārjuna compares substanziell understood developing and passing therefore with Luftspiegelungen and Schimären, with charm deceit and dream things. Which depends on conditions, is empty. Which is empty, has no independent reality. As waves onthe surface of the sea emerge, without thereby water is gained, return and so as the waves again to the ocean, without thereby water is lost, develop and offense the phenomena:
- “Like an illusion (māya), asDream (svapno), like a city of the Gandharvas, then should be regarded developing, existence and passing. “(MMK 7,34)
the things really do not step into the existence, since also their developing depends on conditions - and this dependence makes a finding for onea first cause, a seizable root, not possibly; it loses itself in the Konditionalnexus, the enormous net of the limitation. The phenomena do not exist eternally (ananta), and it come back also not from that nothing (vibhāva), over after their existenceto disappear into the same nothing. They are due to their emptyness, which excludes these two extremes, neither existence nor non-existence.
On the basis of this statement, Nāgārjuna drives its argumentation still another step further forward and describes in a verse, toothe usually-quoted sets of the Mūlamadkyamakakārikā, the indistinguishableness of SAM era and Nirvana on the summit of the realization counts (prajñā):
- “There is nothing that differentiates the SAM era from the Nirvana, and the Nirvana of SAM era. The border of the Nirvana is at the same timethe border SAM era. Between these two the smallest difference is also not found. “ (MMK 25,19-20)
from the point of view of the release there is no more differentiation between the conditioned features of the existence world and the absolute Nirvana. “Causing” and “absolute” are binaryisticand terms referred one on the other. Only that, which did not arrive at the wisdom experience of the universal emptyness, sticks to them, and this blocks the way to the insight to him - he establishes a border between SAM era and Nirvana, which do not give it. Therethe emptyness equal release is, is all natures already in the condition of essenzieller releaseness. It applies itself thus only, this releaseness, those is free from all delimitations to recognize distinctions and extremes to become conscious and it. But this recognizing,thus Nāgārjuna reminds, is not due to the Anatta - teachings as a personal procedure to understand. It makes attentive to the contradiction, which steps in the conception to day, which Nirvana “have”, “achieve”, “attain” or “carry out” to want:
- “'Expiring I becomewithout seizing; me Nirvana will be!' - Those, which are imprisoned in such illusion, those are particularly imprisoned from seizing. '“ (MMK 16,9).
The term of the “emptyness “as central element in Nāgārjunas teachings has thus primarily soteriologische function. Itserves to clear up the everyday view of reality, which is coined/shaped such as language and a thinking by conventions to relate from the perspective of the releaseness in order with certain basic assumptions which a deeper insight and thus the empty heating experience in the way. Fixeddriven thought pattern andConceptions, which flow into each other excluding extremes - among other things those of the “self-unity” (svabhāva) and the “foreign unity” (parabhāva), which “identity” and the “difference” - are to be broken open, around the moving and adhering tendency of thinking, the Nāgārjunawith the expression of the “conceptual development” (prapañca) shows to calm down and dissolve the adjustments exerted by it:
- “Release comes by the destruction of Karma and adhering. Karma and adhering come from differentiating conceptions (vikalpa), them come from the conceptualDevelopment (prapañca). The development however is destroyed in the emptyness. “ (MMK 18,5)
Nāgārjuna warns however several times not to confound the emptyness with “a reality behind the world” or an opinion this reality represented. One should itself before itguard, they for their part for the carrier of a substance or for the “true nature” of the phenomena, an absolute one, to make. The emptyness is to be understood for Nāgārjuna with priority in the sense of an aid, which may not become as such article light:
- “The emptynessof the Buddhas as rejection of any opinion one taught. Those however, for which the emptyness is an opinion, which became for incurably avowedly.“(MMK 13,8).
It is careful therefore according to Nāgārjuna extremely importantly, with the term of the emptynessto go around. It is angedacht as heilsames concept, in order to release from extreme opinions to, can however, if it is misunderstood as opinion, also contrarily affect themselves and damage cause.
- “The wrongly understood emptyness ruins that, which is from weak insight,- like a badly seized queue or a wrongly used magic. “ (MMK 24,11)
it applies to also recognize for this reason that the emptyness as dependent designation empty actual a statement, the Nāgārjuna from the own numbers of reproaches of the Nihilismus (nastitva) and the “self refutation” brought in, since she was misunderstood as theory. The emptyness was never intended as theory of Nāgārjuna, which should replace another theory. It happened to it rather therefore, in the long run all theories behind itselfleave, also those the emptyness. If the emptyness served its purpose as aid and the view for a deeper insight open could, she should be given up, as one a raft behind itself leaves, one to the saving bankbrought and from then on no more is not needed. Even only from it to to speak mischief SAM can affect itself, if the speaking is reifiziert , why Nāgārjuna stresses:
- “One is to say neither “empty” nor “nonempty”, still both, still neither of them.In such a way for the purpose of the communication one [however] may speak. “ (MMK 22,11)
by this example Nāgārjunas argumentation technology shows up by means of “the judgement square” (catuṣkoṭi), which is more near described in the following.
the judgement square (catuṣkoṭi)
the logicalStyle means „of the judgement square “(catuṣkoṭi), also “buddhistisches Tetralemma” mentioned, which uses Nāgārjuna in its argumentation as didactical instrument, is probably a thinking figure decreasing/going back on the Skeptiker Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta mentioned in the Dīghanikāya, which consists of four members, which fourpossible logical alternatives correspond. It is already applied after the excessive quantity by Buddha to questions, which go out its understanding after of the wrong premises and are not correctly posed from the front in here therefore after the context. This proceeding Buddhas is in several places Pali canon tradiert. A text example for this is in a chapter from the “Saṃyuttanikāya “(“grouped collection”), where Kassapa, a Wanderasket and later pupil Buddhas, by Buddha over the emergence of suffering are cleared up:
- Kassapa:Is suffering, Mr. Gotama, caused?
- Buddha: Not so you are to speak, Kassapa.
- Kassapa: Or however suffering of another is caused?
- Buddha: Not so you are to speak, Kassapa.
- Kassapa: For instance suffering both is causedand of another causes?
- Buddha: Not so you are to speak, Kassapa.
- Kassapa: Or however suffering is not caused and also of another not caused, but developed by accident?
- Buddha: Not so you are to speak, Kassapa.
- Kassapa: Is there thus, Mr. Gotama, at all no suffering?
- Buddha: There is probably a suffering, Kassapa.
- Kassapa: Thus does Mr. Gotama know a suffering not and does see it not?
- Buddha: I probably know a suffering, I probably see a suffering, Kassapa.
- Kassapa: So to me the raised one suffering may state, may it to me announce.
- Thereupon the Buddha answered recapitulatory: “One states, the same one is it, which implements the action and which feels the consequences, then gives it to one, ofBeginning there actual states one of, that suffering is caused, then one comes thereby on eternally a lasting outside. - Maintains one another is it, which implements the action and which feels the consequences, like thatthere is one, which is affected by feeling. If one states of, a suffering is caused from another, then one comes on a complete destruction outside. Avoiding these two ends, those announces Kassapa in the center of the Tathāgataprotect teachings: To ignorance the organizations are due, to the organizations due are consciousness… “ (Saṃyutta Nikāya SN 12,17)
in this example argue Buddha with the negation of all four members catuṣkoṭi. He tries thereby, on those already tendentiousto refer to in the questions hidden extreme opinions of the eternity faith and the destruction teachings, which are to be avoided after buddhistischem thinking.
- Something is (so)
- something is not (so)
- something is both (then) and not (so)
- something is neither (then) not yet (so)
the buddhistische logic goes out in accordance with the central theory of non--even of the fact that A not alsois identical, i.e.: A is not A (isolates believed is in reality an incorrect impression, which comes off by the fact that the process confounds constantly again more meeting and again auseinanderfallener groupings of existence factors with a steady I,and this mistake by adhering is strengthened and maintained). This means, which basic premise of the formal logic - self identity (A = A) - is answered in the negative from the beginning. But in the next step likewise the difference is negated: A is thus just as fewNot A (it none is in and outside of the existence factors to find). The two steps following on it finally are, since they represent only combinations of the first two steps to reject as just as wrong.
It applies in accordance with this proceeding assistancecatuṣkoṭi not to prove something as irrefutable truth to falsifizieren i.e. a statement or to replace a wrong by the correct truth, but rather to refer to the weak points in certain argumentation forms and trains of thought which work against a realization.The only valid criterion, after which a statement can be evaluated therefore in the long run, lies whether the saying is favorable welfare SAM and for a deep-going insight or not. Manners of statement, even if they belong to the relative level, are necessarily, over therebyInstructional contents to mediate and transport, must work however as “welfare SAM established”, and therefore refer their truth content from the practical applicability.
Actual, complete understanding carries out itself then in the nonverbalen insight, what in the Zen also as “nicht-denkendesThink " (jap.hishiryo) admits is. Thus the application of the “judgement square” possesses two aspects: a dekonstruktiven, i.e. the function, the “dead ends” of the limiting to point restricting and mischief seed out of thinking and at the same time a constructional, i.e. the function, ignorance (avidyā) inTo transfer wisdom (prajñā) thus beyond limiting thinking and away-transmit from it. Elements from catuṣkoṭi appear until today in some Mondos and Kōan of the Zen - tradition.
the science of that“Two truths” (satyadvaya)
- “with the Verkündigung of the Dharma relied the Buddhas on the two truths: The one is the lay, “euphemistic truth” (saṃvṛtisatya), the other one is ‚the truth in the highest sense' (paramārthasatya).Those, which do not recognize the difference of the two truths, those do not recognize also the deep truth (tattva) in the teachings Buddhas. “ (MMK 24,8 - 24,9)
- “without itself not on application [the words] (vyavahara) to support, those can Truth in the highest sense not to be shown; and without to the truth in the highest sense to have advanced, Nirvana is not attained. “ (MMK 24,10)
the methodology of differentiating between truth in the highest sense, addressed in above quotation of Nagarjuna and in this form until today by all buddhistischen schools remained away for veiled, truth being based on convention, which was consistently continued in the later Madhyamaka. The view that no statement possesses absolute validity, but as relative andif conditioned statement for their welfare SAMness to examine is, formulation of the “two truths” has their firm place in all buddhistischen directions since Nagarjunas.
Already in the “basket of the papers “a first frühbuddhistischer beginning is for the model of the “twoTruths ", by between the reality levels “samutti sacca” and “paramattha sacca” one differentiates. In this early form the “two truths” refer to the reality status of the existence factors (dharmas) in the contrast to the lay conditions, those from their conditioned interactiondepend. As not far reducible constituents of the empirical reality here highest reality comes to the existence factors, it therefore “paramattha dhammas” is also called. Which the existence factors constitute - the everyday conception of “I”, “mine”, of concrete, substanceful, from each other independent thingsand persons - however one assigns to the level of the veiled reality.
Nagarjuna took up this model, changed thereby however, now using the Sanskrit terms “samvritti satya” and “paramartha satya”, the organization of the reality degrees fundamentally. Before still in the abhidharmischen senseas “the highest reality” it - like all verbal printable one - shifted described existence factors on the level “samvritti satya”, the veiled truth. The highest truth cannot be said, one can only on it point by means of conventional truth - overit thereupon in a more deeply going experiencing intuitive insight directly. This basic attitude e.g. becomes. in the Zen - saying “the finger, which points to the moon, is not illustrated the moon”.
- weber Brosamer, bake: Philosophy thatEmptiness. Nāgārjuna Mulamadhyamaka Karikas. Translation of the buddhistischen basis text with commentating introductions. Wiesbaden 1997 (contributions to the Indologie 28).ISBN 3447052503
- Batchelor, Stephen: Nāgārjuna - verses from the center. A buddhistische vision of the life. Theseus publishing house, Berlin: 2002. ISBN 3896201816
- Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso:The Sun OF pointing cathedral - Teachings on the Noble Nāgārjuna's fundamentally pointing cathedral OF the Middle Way (well--Joo-well), Shambala Publications 2003, ISBN 1570629994
Web on the left of
- Mūlamadkyamakakārikā - Sanskrit original (Devanagari & transcription) in the pdf format. Douglas Bachman, 2001.
- Andreas Goppold: The logic of the theory of the emptiness: The Shunyata of the Nāgārjuna. Project Leonardo Leibniz, 1994.
- Jonah of winter: “Thinking in Buddhism - Nagarjuna's Middle Way”, (English) in the pdf format
- Stephen Batchelor: “Verses from the Centre” (translation of the Mūlamadkyamakakārikā from the Tibetan one inEnglish one). Sharpham college, 2000.
| | * Literature of and over Nagarjuna in the catalog of the DDB
|SHORT DESCRIPTION||it is considered to Buddhismus as a founder of the Shûnyavâda school within the Mahayana -.|
|DATE OF BIRTH||2. Jh.|
|PLACE OF BIRTH||southIndia|