Copyright Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, known as the Copyright Clause (or the intellectual property clause) empowers the United States Congress:
- To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
The clause actually confers two distinct powers. The power to secure for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their writings is the basis for U.S. copyright law. The power to secure for limited times to inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries is the basis for U.S. patent law. Because the clause contains no language under which Congress may protect trademarks, those are instead protected under the Commerce Clause.
This is the only clause granting power to Congress for which the means to accomplish its stated purpose are specifically provided. The exact limitations of this clause have been defined through a number of United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the text. For example, the Court has determined that because the purpose of the clause is to promote progress, it can not be used in a way that would inhibit such progress. Because of this, the Court has developed the fair use doctrine to permit certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted material.
Furthermore, the clause only permits protection of the writings and discoveries of authors and inventors. Hence, writings may only be protected to the extent that they are original, and "inventions" must be truly inventive, and not merely obvious improvements on existing knowledge.
Although perpetual copyrights and patents are prohibited because the language specifies "limited times", the Supreme Court has ruled in Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003) that repeated extensions to the term of copyright do not constitute perpetual copyright. In that case, the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act that was based in part on the Copyright Clause. Petitioners in that case argued that successive retroactive extensions of copyright were functionally unlimited and hence violated the limited times language in the clause. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, rejected this argument, reasoning that the terms provided by the Act were limited in duration and noting that Congress had a long history of granting retroactive extensions.
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